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I. Introduction
A central problem concerning communication between people of different
cultures is the representation of the ‘others’ as different from ‘us’. Many of
these representations have a long history, in other words, they feed upon figures
created in the encounter of Europeans with non-Europeans – indigenous
Americans, Asians, Africans – products of the expansion of the European
powers, in turn – Spanish, Portuguese, English, French – to other continents.
This history also covers the encounter of the Anglo-Saxon Americans with
people of other ‘races’ like the Mexicans in the southwest of the United States.
When we speak of Others different from us’ we are not referring exclusively to
other ‘exotic’ people, but rather in general to all those marked by their dif-
ferences from a racial, sexual, social, national, or ethnic perspective.
Some of the frequently cited works in the field of intercultural communication
in Denmark are based on the representation of the Others.1 Although these
representations are subjective constructions, they attempt to make us believe
that they deal with the ‘reality’ about the Others, since the descriptions are
endorsed by graphs, statistics, and computational models.2 Nevertheless, they
deal with ultra-simplifications made from the cultural values of researchers
anchored in a specifically northern European culture and without a methodical
and critical separation with regard to it. Mexicans, Venezuelans, and Chileans,
for example, are represented as people who are distanced in relation to power
(authoritarian), as people who have a great tendency to avoid uncertainty (con-
trol and hierarchies), as collectivists (not individualistic), and therefore not
modern.3 One must ask, collectivists, authoritarians, hierarchical: With respect
to whom? Who is the evaluating subject?  The main problem with this sort of
ultra-simplification, presented otherwise as a scientific one, is that certain
groups’ characteristics are shown as the true nature of the citizens of the na-
tion.
Representations of the Others  that are more or less partial, distorted, selective,
ultra-simplified, or deformed persist, at times, in spite of education, travel
experiences, or information of individual people. At a collective level, in certain
1 Here I am thinking about works like Geert Hofstede (1984). Cultures Consequences:
International Differences in Work-Related Values”. Sage, Bever Hills, California and that
of Erik Kærgaard Kristensen (1993). Kulturforskelle og den internationale markedsføring.
Samfundslitteratur.
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social and economic circumstances (as those in which we live in today’s Europe
with rather considerable immigration coming from Arab countries and Africa)
sociopsychological scenarios appear in which negative representations of the
Others become sharper, returning to the stigmatization of entire groups because
of their religious beliefs. Our beliefs and attitudes toward the Others, the images
that we emphasize, and the words that we use when we refer to them have
consequences and they are an important factor in our communication.
A current of cognitive sociology – to which Scandinavian experts in intercultural
communication such as Øyvind Dahl4 adhere – affirm that the selectivity and
ultra-simplification of the representation of the Others are necessary and
inevitable as they are a product of mental mechanisms in the processing of
stimuli. This perspective leaves us disarmed before partial, distorted and in-
strumental representations of the Others. For this reason it is necessary to
examine some central suppositions and presuppositions and to confront the
cognitive approach with alternative conceptions of this problem, such as those
inspired by semiotics, rhetoric and social psychology that realize not only the
limitations, but also the possibilities of choice in the representation of the Others.
New research in social psychology and rhetoric have seriously questioned the
cognitive comprehension of the thought process and the representation and
sowing of serious doubts about the inevitability of prejudice and stereotypes
from now on in this process. If these figures of representation cannot be attri-
buted to a “cognitive iron cage (in the sense that we are talking about psycho-
logical mechanisms from which we can’t escape) how can we explain the fact
that the majority of the representations of the “Others different from Us” might
be negatively or positively exaggerated? To answer this question I think that it
2 I refer to the work of Hofstede previously cited and the innumerable articles and academic
works based on the ideas and beliefs of Hofstede.
3 These simplistic categorizations can be questioned from many angles. I mention only two.
The categories depend on the culture of the subject that creates them. Would a studious
Frenchman, Mexican, or Chinese consider the Chilean culture as having a great power
distance? The Danish culture in the schemata of Hofstede is associated with individualism.
But how is it that in an individualistic society one must pay 50% and more of one’s salary
for the welfare of the society as a whole? A culture can be individualistic and collectivist,
depending on the sphere being discussed. For this reason, I see the schemata of Hofstede as
an ultrasimplification bordering on stereotypes.
4 Øyvind Dahl (1995). “The Use of Stereotypes in Intercultural Comunication”. In: “Essays
on Culture and Communication (edited by Torben Vestergaard). Language and Culture
Contact 10. Alborg University: Aalborg.
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is necessary to see the attitudes, beliefs, prejudices, and stereotypes in the
broadest context as tied to ideologies. The symbolic constructions permit us to
learn, evaluate, or communicate a reality. Often, this occurs as ideo-logical
creations and argumentations, in other words, in a partial way, legitimizing
dominance, exploitation, and inequality.
These are some of the reasons of the persistence of stereotyping and prejudice.
There are others of a psychological nature, such as the fascination we have for
exact exotic peoples.
II. Representation and Meaning
Representation is narrowly tied to meaning. In effect, we give sense and meaning
to things through usage: that which we say, think, and feel about them.  On the
other hand, we give meaning to events, people, and objects by means of inter-
pretive maps in which we place ourselves. Therefore, our evaluation of these
people, events, and objects may be very different although we may be refer-
ring to the same “reality”. Yet, we also give meaning to things, people, and
objects through the manner in which we represent them, the feelings that we
associate with them, the images that we use, and the stories that we tell.
In order to represent these things, people, and objects we make use of signs,
that is to say words, sounds, or images that replace a concept or something in
reality, or of something else.
Culture deals precisely with the production and exchange of meanings and
that is why we can say that the members of one culture tend to see the world in
a similar manner, which does not mean that a culture might necessarily be
unitary. We must recall that Nero and Seneca were members of the same culture
as were Pinochet and Allende. In fact, in any culture there is more than one
meaning concerning people, events, and objects; moreover – and this is im-
portant – there is a battle for that significance.5 The way in which we cate-
gorize the world and the significance we give to things influence our behavior.
Therefore, those who are interested in influencing our behavior fight to made
their meanings become the dominant ones. Thus, culture is not only a matter
of ideas and concepts, but rather also a matter of feelings. Jews under Nazism
experienced this after the Nazis were successful in giving a specific significance
to the word “Jew”.
6
Meaning is also tied to identity in the sense that the demarcations made by the
culture to which we pertain allow us to distinguish between those who are
‘within’ and those who are ‘outside’. The representations of personal identity
and national culture also perform in this sense since we can know what it
means to be Danish, Mexican, or Spanish just by the representations that have
been made of Danish-ness, Mexican-ness, or Spanish-ness.
As I have indicated, we represent with the help of semiotic systems. They are
in place of our concepts, ideas, and feelings. For this reason, at the moment of
studying the question of the mimesis or representation of the Other, the semiotics
of theory, concepts, and methods constitute a principal discipline.6 Another
central approximation involves the theories of discourse. I understand discourse
as a form of talking about a topic and the images, ideas, and practices associated
with it.
III. From stereotypes as necessary and inevitable to
stereotypes as ideology and fascination
III.a. Stereotypes and prejudice
The study of representation is not exhausted. Nevertheless, it is the problem
that concerns me. The relationship between representations and behavior is
neither direct nor simple. Two Danish businessmen, for example, might share
a similar representation of Muslims, but one of them, in spite of this, and for
reasons of profit, might decide to employ workers of the same ethnic group,
while the other, because of strong feelings of aversion that his representation
provokes in him, does not do it, in spite of possible losses. On the other hand,
there is no doubt that there is a graduation from less to more violence in our
behavior toward the Others who are negatively represented. This graduation
ranges from speaking badly about someone to (at the other extreme) torture
and extermination.
5 Think, for example, about the controversy about how to qualify the Chechens that fight
against the Russian invasion. Are they terrorists or resistance fighters? Categorization has a
series of serious political and legal consequences.
6 Examples of the use of semiotics are works like those of Jan Gustafsson and Stuart Hall
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Representations are tied to beliefs and attitudes. Because of this, it is reasonable
to return our sights to social psychology which, through studies of stereotypes
and prejudice, offers us some explanations as to how and why distorted or
generalized images of groups and individuals – and the attitudes and behaviors
tied to them – persist and resist change.
One of the methods of clarifying the question of negative representations and
attitudes is through the cognitive process. This approximation has been based
in great measure on the ideas of Gordon W. Allport and are developed in his
classic work, The Nature of Prejudice (1954).
Allport’s ideas have as context the recently lived experience of World War II
and the subsequent efforts to avoid a similar catastrophe. Researches efforts
are focused on how to better human relationships. On one hand, technical and
scientific conquests and the dominance over nature were indeed impressive,
confirms Allport. But, from the point of view of human relations the situation
was quite different. His description of the animosity between Muslims and
non-Muslims, of the situation of the Jews and the refugees that arrived in
inhospitable countries are disturbingly similar to the current situation. The
experience of World War II and the tragedy of the Jews leads him to search for
the roots of prejudice, which are seen as an obstacle to human relations and an
impediment to the development of the abilities affiliated with the human per-
sona. What is prejudice? Allport asks and offers various definitions: “thinking
ill of others without sufficient warrant“, understanding “thinking ill” as both
feelings of rejection and hostile behavior. Allport distinguishes between, on
the one hand, prior judgment with a basis and, on the other hand, prejudice.
Thus, the negative representation and feelings of rejection of the great majority
of the North American population toward the Nazi leadership, according to
him, was not prejudice as they had a solid base in the knowledge of the theory
and practice of the Nazis approved by these leaders.
Prejudice is also described as a hostile attitude and shunning of a person because
he belongs to a group with criticizable characteristics. The “erroneous” and
“inflexible” character of the representations contained in prejudice are empha-
sized in all of these definitions. The definition of prejudice from the Oxford
Dictionary comprises a good summary of the different definitions that Allport
presents:
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“Dislike or distrust of a person, group, custom, etc. that is based on fear or false
information rather than on reason or experience, and that influences one’s attitude
and behaviour towards them”. (Oxford: 909)
Where does prejudice come from? According to Allport, certain mental charac-
teristics and human nature such as tendencies to generalization, hostility, which,
to a lesser extent, causes us to group ourselves with people of our ethnic group.
The process of categorization is fundamental to the formation of prejudice and
stereotypes; we think with the help of categories and in this process: a) the
mind forms groups and classes to guide our daily actions; b) it assimilates as
much as possible within each group; c) the categories allow us to quickly identify
an object; d) we call the purely intellectual categories concepts, but generally
the concepts are added to a feeling. Example: School, I like school; e) categories
can be more or less rational, the former are developed based on a nucleus of
truth, the latter are not. The fundamental thing in the prejudice-category rela-
tionship, from the perspective of the consequences that it has had for these last
concepts, is Allport’s idea that categorization carries with it an erroneous
simplification:
 “Man has a propensity to prejudice. This propensity lies in  his normal and natural
tendency to form generalizations, concepts, categories, whose content represents
an oversimplification of his world of experience.” 7
Allport’s conception about stereotypes was ambivalent. Influenced by Adorno,
he distinguished from the outset between category and stereotypes: “A stereo-
type is not identical with a category; it is rather a fixed idea that accompanies
the category”. Thus, for example, black is the category, and stereotypes are
the images that add a bias to the category: musical, good runners, sexually
well-endowed, rhythmic, etc.
However, he later underlined the idea that categorization implied generalization
and distortion and that this was the basis of prejudice and stereotypes. This last
idea impregnated all cognitive psychology that has seen categorization as a
cardinal cognitive process that allows us to structure and give coherence to our
knowledge of reality and to the social world. In this approximation, from a
biologist perspective, categorization implies distortion and simplification. As
other living creatures, human beings organize the world from stimuli through
various perspectives – edible/inedible, dangerous/not dangerous, etc.
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This rationale arrives at the conclusion about the need for stereotypes. Effec-
tively, if categorization is a function of thought and if all categorization implies
generalization, the stereotype is an inevitable derivation of the same function
of thought.
A Scandinavian expert in intercultural communication arrives at conclusions
similar to these in his ‘The Uses of Stereotypes in Intercultural Communication’.
In this article Dahl affirms that the predictions that we make about the Others
(foreigners) will inexorably be based on stereotypes and that this is a necessary
and inevitable process. Furthermore,
 “We must recognize that we cannot communicate with people from our own or
another culture (or talk about them) without stereotypes” 8
The same concept of the stereotype, based on suppositions as to how thought
functions, runs the risk of converting itself into a legitimization of them. Not
only this, but also the study of stereotypes and the representations of the Others
loses interest and leaves us impotent before racism, xenophobia, and sexual
discrimination. So in effect, if stereotypes are an inevitable product of univer-
sal cognitive mechanisms and therefore necessary and inevitable, they have
no importance other than that of being an illustration of how cognition functions
and, even worse, they are unable to change, or to be questioned or counteracted.
Nevertheless, we know that the representations of the Others are modified
(that of Jews, blacks, Arabs, women, homosexuals, Russians) to a different
degree from society to society, at distinct rhythms, but they do change. Stereo-
types not only change, but at times certain representations of them disappear,
a product of historical context and they are politically specific (i.e. that of
European Jews post WWII) to become newly discerned: today’s European
Jews.
In addition, this manner of understanding stereotypes is rather boring if we do
not consider – in light of the supposed universal character of cognitive me-
chanisms – the historical and cultural contexts that give form and contribute to
the development of stereotypes.
7 Gordon W. Allport (1954). The Nature of Prejudice, p. 27. Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company: Cambridge, Massachussets.
8 Dahl Øyvind (1995). “The Use of Stereotypes in Intercultural Comunication”, p. 17.
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The criticisms of the concepts that see prejudice and stereotypes as derivative
of a so-called iron cage built by universal laws of cognition have made the
social, historical, and collective sides of the figures of representation of the
Others visible.
From the outset, the existence of an essential difference between the proces-
sing of stimuli of living beings on the one hand and human beings on the other
can be affirmed. The peculiarity of human beings resides precisely in the fact
that their access to the world is made through gigantic symbolic or semiotic
systems, depending on how one understands the concepts of symbol and sign.9
The categorizations of human beings are made principally through a key semio-
tic system: language. Language allows us to represent people, groups, and
happenings in simplified or enriched forms, in a prejudiced or tolerant manner.
Language can be used to group details and to generalize or to particularize and
argue special cases.
For these reasons, authors such as Michael Billig have suggested that, in place
of considering the same process of thought starting with the bureaucratic mo-
del (which uses categorization to make things malleable and predictable) it is
much more appropriate to see this process from the perspective of rhetorical
metaphor, in other words, the person can argue, critique, and persuade.
Thus, even racists and fascists often argue their points of view in a complicated
manner.10
The conclusions of authors such as Dahl fall on one side of the equalization of
category with stereotype and on the other, the supposed process of thought and
communication is made only in relation to these categories. But, as Allport
indicated, category and stereotype are not the same. Categories are necessary
to understand ‘reality’, to create order, but they are flexible and they change. It
might suffice to just remember which categories are used to recognize social
9 Those that have been mentioned, among others, by Cassier, Susanne Langer and Clifford
Geerz. Ernst Cassier (1982). Las ciencias de la cultura. Fondo de Cultura Económica:
México. From the same author (1989) Esencia y efecto del concepto de símbolo. Fondo de
Cultura Económica: México. Susanne K. Langer (1969). Menneske og symbol. Gyldendals
Uglebøger: Haslev. Clifford Geertz (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. BasicBooks,
HarperCollins Publishers.
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groups in a determined society today, fifty, and three hundred years ago. On
the other hand, stereotypes apparently give us a feeling of order and security,
but are inflexible and try to freeze one meaning.
When we think and communicate we are not only using categories but we are
also making distinctions within them, observing generalities and discussing
concrete cases. We see collective attributes and individual ways of being.11
The same categories are elastic as concepts like ‘democracy’ and ‘violence’
demonstrate12 and if categorization is a necessary element of thought and com-
munication is also particularization. The former cannot exist without the lat-
ter.13
Stereotypes constitute an inadequate way of representing the Others. First,
because they isolate certain sections and behaviors, some inclinations, they
snatch them from their historical and cultural context, and they attribute them
to all the individuals in a social group. Second, they ignore or they put a slant
on certain central aspects of the identity of groups of victims of stereotyping,
or of their culture and of their social life. Finally, they ‘freeze’ the representation
of the Others impeding alternative ways of seeing and understanding them. In
this process, the press plays a central role in contemporary western societies.
They represent metonymically certain ethnic groups, demonize them, contribute
to their marginalization, and ignore others. Finally, we can add that stereotypes
about an ethnic group can be contradictory as illustrated by the following
paragraph by Argentine writer and essayist Ernesto Sábato about Jews and
anti-Semites:
 Nevertheless, and violating the principle of contradiction, a basis for Aristotelian
logic, the anti-Semite will say successively – and yet simultaneously – that the Jew
is a banker and a Bolshevik, greedy and squandering, limited to his ghetto and
with a finger in every pie. It is apparent that in these conditions Jews have no
escape: whatever he says, does, or thinks will fall under the jurisdiction of anti-
10 See Billig Michael (1985). “Prejudice, categorization and particularization: from a
perceptual to a rhetorical approach”. European Journal of Social Psychology.
11 See Michael Pickering (2001). Stereotyping. The Politics of Representation, pp. 28-29.
Palgrave: New York.
12 What is the common element, for example, of the American, Scandinavian, and Indian
democracy? Is violence only physical aggression or is it also the tremendous social differences
that condemn children to sickness, hunger, and illiteracy?
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Semitism. It doesn’t matter if he is generous or miserly, dirty or clean, elegant or
unkempt, shy or bold, religious or atheist.14
This underlines that the key to the stereotype as a figure of representation is
not in the greater or lesser approach to the ‘reality’ of the image of the person
or group, but rather in the justification of the aversion.
We represent the Others using language or images and they give us the
opportunity to represent them in a generalized or particularized, prejudiced or
tolerant, rigid or flexible way.
If we are not obligated by strict laws of cognition to choose the first category
of these opposites, the question arises as to why groups more or less conside-
red within a nation or group of nations hold to partial, rigid, metonymic
representations of the Others.
IV. Ideology and symbolic constructions
Representations of the Others can be seen as ideologies. As the very concept
has many meanings, it is necessary to define it in order to make it operative. It
can be discerned, with certain clarity, between two forms of seeing the ideolo-
gy.15 The non-evaluative conception represented by, among others, Mannheim
and Clifford Geertz is on one side. It relates to a conception that defines the
ideology as beliefs, ideas, or as symbolical systems, unless the content of these
beliefs or ideas are necessarily negative or problematic.
Therefore, from the perspective of anthropology, Clifford Geertz has thought
of ideology as cultural schemes that attempt to offer us orientation before a
problematic reality. In effect, Geertz states that:
Culture patterns “religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological” are
”programs”; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social
13  See Billig, op. cit, p. see Billig p. 86. Also, “Arguing about categories”, in Billig (1996).
Arguing and thinking. A rhetorical approach to social psychology, pp. 176-182.
14 Sábato 1991:  30-31.
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and psychological processes, much as genetic systems provide such a template for
the organization of organic processes.”16
Another vital contribution of Clifford Geertz’ concept of ideology is the pointing
out of its rhetorical character. Ideologies, according to the American anthro-
pologist, move away from the moderate language of science and they utilize
figures such as the metaphor, metonymy, and hyperbole. It is not necessary to
recall the metaphor of the Muslims as “invaders” in Denmark, or the metonymy
of the Muslim as a religious fanatic and macho, or the hyperbolic images of
them as rapists and bloodthirsty.
Those that see ideology as an illusion, deceit, hidden, distortion, and falsehood
are seen as situated on the other extreme of the conception of ideology. This is
an idea already contained in Marx and developed by many authors inspired by
him. Here I will limit myself to presenting some studies that examine ideology
from this angle.
Thus, from a semiotic perspective Ronald Barthes developed the idea of various
levels of meaning.17 It is said that a sign can, in a second level, comprise itself
in the meaning of a new sign derived from the first. This idea of new levels of
meaning is important, because it allows understanding of mythologies of
modernity and (why not?) of post modernity. Barthes’ intuition can be illustrated
with the example of the car or automobile that on the first level means an self-
propelled vehicle used to travel, and on the second (depending on the type of
car) it can mean prestige, wealth, youth, sportive air, good taste, etc. On the
third level, and in certain social contexts, it can be associated with the idea of
technical sophistication, comfort, speed, saving time, the ability to travel in
diverse terrain, protection and comfort that permit one to become independent
of rain and wind (control over nature), etc. We enter right into the mythology of
modernity. The themes, plots, and characters of the ancient myths open the
road and manage to express themselves as events and sports spectacles, in film
or in literature: the good and the bad, “Us” and “Them”, David versus Goliath,
the just sacrificed, nature against man, etc.
15  On the different ways of conceiving ideology, see Poul Ricoeur (1999). Ideología y
Utopía. Gedisa editorial: Barcelona.Also John B. Thompson (1990). Ideology and Modern
Culture. Polity Press: Oxford
16  Clifford Geertz (1973)  “Ideology As a Cultural System”, p. 216. In (by the same author)
The Interpretation of Cultures. BasicBooks, HarperCollins Publishers..
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Concepts can also convert themselves into myths. Therefore childhood has
been seen as a depository for innocence, uncorrupt, uncontaminated and good
only in modern times.18 The connection of modern mythologies with ancient
symbols filled with meaning help to explain the psychic inversion and the
state of mind in “epic poetry” like the “Tour de France”.
Another vision of ideology is that of the semiotic and writer Umberto Eco.19
For Eco, ideology is a partial and unconnected vision of the world that is
characterized by concealing – in the choice of words and in argumentation –
alternative meanings and relationships, because of not taking into account the
complexity and character, at times contradictory, in semantic fields. Eco offers
the example of the maximum adjective in relation to a mechanical apparatus
and the calculations of /pressure/ /heating/ and /production/. While a maximum
has positive connotations in the calculations of 2 and 3, it has a negative con-
notation in 1 = danger. An ideological reasoning in which heating and production
are the supreme values and equated with general happiness conceals the ultimate
meaning and with it the incompatibility between these values and general
security.
We can denominate these approaches to ideology as criticisms. Thompson’s
approximation is within the same perspective, but with a clearly different nu-
ance that makes situations in which ideology is united with power stand out,
limiting the use of the concept and ideas and beliefs that establish and sustain
dominance. Dominance exists when we find ourselves faced with a systematic
asymmetry of groups and individuals in relationship to power:
“When particular agents are endowed with power in a durable way which excludes,
and to some significant degree remains inaccessible to, other agents or groups of
agents, irrespective of the basis upon which such exclusion is carried out”20
17 Barthes Roland, 1999. Mitologías. Siglo Veintiuno: Madrid (First edition in Spanish,
1980). By the same author (1971) Elementos de semiología. Comunicación : Madrid . See
also the Introduction by Paul Cobley (1996) a The Communication Theory Reader. Routledge,
London and New York, and M.,Gottdiener (1995)  Postmodern Semiotics. Material Culture
and the Forms of Postmodern Life. Basil  Blackwell: Oxford.
18 See Marcel Danesi and Poul Perron (1999). Analyzing Cultures. An Introduction and
Hanbook, p. 259. Indiana University Press: Bloomington, Indiana.
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It is important to point out that dominance does not limit itself – as Marxist
tradition tends to – to the relationships between classes. It goes much further,
and includes, in the world in which we live, the relationship between the sexes,
between ethnic majorities and minorities, between nations, etc.
Now, ideology operates in five different ways to those different strategies tied
to symbolic construction.
These ways and strategies with certain adjustments and interpretations seem
to me to be adequate to analyze the question of the representation of the Others.
Before discussing them, I would like to point out two important aspects of
ideology in the concepts of Thompson. One of these is the special situation of
ideologies in modern and secularized society as a substitute species from myths
and religion that used to give sense to social organization and to life in pre-
industrialized societies.21 The other is the importance of the press in the diffu-
sion of these ideologies. As a result of the impact of visions, ideas, stories, and
images in societies with newspapers, radio, television, and film, it is immense
and, in fact, for the questions at hand, it is obvious that the representation that
is made in other ethnic groups in the press, television, and film, are of decisive
importance.
Whatever domination, as indicated by Max Weber, needs a legitimization in
order to be stable; in other words, ideas and images that might make the domi-
nation acceptable and valid. A legitimizing ideology can be validated by
symbolic construction of strategies such as: a) rationalization, or reasonings
that justify determined social relations and institutions and that present them
as worthy of support; b) universalization, that is, the interests of an institution,
group, or nation are presented as the best and most advantageous for all other
individuals, nations, etc.; c) narrativization, includes the stories, legends, and
myths associated with a timeless past and ideal that confers unity and cohesion
to a nation or ethnic group despite the social, economic, situational differences,
etc.
19 In: Eco Umberto (1977)  Tratado de semiótica general. Barcelona, Lumen.
20 See John B. Thompson (1990) Ideology and Modern Culture. Critical Social Theory in
the Era of Mass Comunication, p. 59. Polity Press: Oxford.
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Another way of working with ideology that makes it possible to establish and
maintain dominant relationships is through dissimulation, which operates
through denial and the hiding of these relationships. The strategies of symbolic
construction tied to this method are: a) displacement, when a term that is
typically used to refer to a person or object is employed to refer to another
moving toward positive or negative connotations from one to the other: “the
allies” to refer to the United States and England in the war against Iraq; b)
euphemism, the selective representation of relationships of power with the goal
of obtaining a positive evaluation such as when torture, execution and exile of
political opponents is termed the “restoration of law and order” or concent-
ration camps, “rehabilitation centers”; c) tropes (metonymy, metaphor) meto-
nymy in which the veil represents all women who come from nations where
the religion is Islam or the metaphor is that of immigration such as “the Mus-
lim invasion”.
A third mode of operation is the unification that attempts to elide the differences
of economic or social power or of another type building a symbolic unity, for
example, speaking a determined language or being a member of a national
Church.
A fourth mode is the fragmentation that operates emphasizing the differences
between groups and people and obviating the similarities. The supposed
differences that stand out can refer to attitudes, beliefs, or appearance. In extreme
cases,  one can arrive at the elimination of the different Others: “the eradication
of the Marxist cancer”.22
A fifth mode is the reification, which, following Thompson, allows that:
“Relations of domination may be established and sustained by representing a
transitory, historical state of affairs as if it were permanent, natural, outside the
time. Processes are portrayed as things or as events of a quasi-natural kind, in
such a way that their social and historical character is eclipsed.”23
21 Idea already mentioned by other authors such as Goddenier, and Barthes in works previously
mentioned.
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Reification deals with strategies by means of naturalization, certain situations
that are the product of historical, social, and cultural factors are presented as
the result of natural characteristics. Dominance over women, for example, has
been supported by the idea that the psychological and biological characteristics
of women have made them suitable only for certain professions and jobs and
exclude them from others.
Another strategy is eternalization. Relationships of power in certain societies
cause the receptors to see their superior identity confirmed through messages
that stand out as in “things have always been this way”. This is the case of tea
advertisements that show pride and the magnificence of the Empire. Or tourist
brochures that offer an exotic “Other” as a perpetual theater backdrop in which
the lives of the white tourists can be represented.24
V. Anglo-Saxonism and the American Representation of
Mexicans
If we examine the strategies of symbolic construction – that may or may not be
ideological – we can observe that the form in which we represent the Others
has been and is utilized to legitimize the oppression and approval of the resour-
ces of certain groups to the detriment of others. Thus, the legitimization of the
expansion of the United States by means of the strategies of rationalization
and universalization plants its roots in Biblical motives about a man’s (white
and Protestant) right to subjugate and exploit nature.25 The English Puritans
that conquered and colonized North America understood themselves to be like
the personification of civilization and saw nature that was not cultivated with
suspicion and contempt. They associated the chaos and disarray that they were
observing in nature as the undoing by and the dwelling of the devil. The conquest
and dominance over nature was a metaphor of the internal conquest of their
passions and desires.
22 This is how the persecution and murder of political opponents of the dictatorship of
General Pinochet was justified. See Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela (1991). Chile
a Nation of Enemies. Chile Under Pinochet, p. 47. W. W. Norton & Company: New York,
London.
23 Thompson op.cit.,  p. 65.
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The Illustration with its emphasis on material progress and the rationale that
demands the control of nature was later united with the religious legitimization
of this conquest and dominance, and had Darwinist motives. The domestication
of nature was seen as a “heroic war”.
The mission of the white man was to better and correct nature, eradicate evil,
and promote good among living beings. The racial motive became present and
a series of justified oppositions of the Puritan colonial mission were established:
Civilization Nature
Progress Primitivism
Christianity Paganism
Whites (Protestants) Redskins and blacks
Light Shadow
Good Evil
In the same way that the Americans understood themselves as a personification
of civilization, they saw the indigenous as the personification of uncultivated
nature. Virtue and its fruits – private property and economic greatness –
depended on the continual and systematic exploitation of nature. Indigenous
Americans had been (in the vision of the Puritan colonizers) incapable of
exploiting natural resources. Doing it and imposing civilization were a divine
mandate that legitimized the appropriation of indigenous property.
The American expansion to the west and south was justified by the belief in
the superiority of their civilization and the right to subdue nature and groups
seen as slaves by nature: women, Indians, blacks, Latin Americans. Many of
24 See Robert Ferguson (1998). Representing ‘Race’. Ideology, identity and the media, p.
53. Arnold: London.
25 These affirmations of the character of the English colonists in America and about the
stereotypes and prejudices of Americans regarding Indians, Afro-Americans, Mexicans and
Hispanic Americans in general are based on the book by the North American historian
Fredrick B. Pike (1992). The United States and Latin America. Myths and Stereotypes of
Civilization and Nature. University of Texas Press: Austin. Pike’s book is based on hundreds
of primary and secondary sources.
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the stereotypes and mythologies about the Indians and blacks were later
attributed to the inhabitants of the other America, largely populated by people
of color considered effeminate for being closer to nature, as were women being
people of feelings rather than reason, adhering to a religion with a feminine
mysticism as opposed to rational and intellectual proofs, lacking self-control,
having a tendency to submission, etc.
A clear example of how the representations of the other can be tied to ideologies
and be symbolic constructions by means of which ideology operates is the
elaboration of the Anglo-Saxonizing of the United States in the 1830s and
1840s.26 This ideology came from the encounters and conflicts of Americans
and Mexicans in the American southwest, around the rebellion of Texas and in
relation to the Mexican-American War. From the first encounters and conflicts
it became clear that American and Mexican interests were not the same and
that the imposition of American interests would carry with it the suffering of
the Mexicans. Americans were also anxiously looking for explicative models
of their apparent success and of the similar failure of the Spanish-speaking
American. The explanation of the failure and the legitimization of the suffering
inflicted on the Mexicans is achieved through the creation of a series of beliefs
about their racial inferiority and about a mythology about the virtues of the
Anglo-Saxon ‘race’. It was much easier to attribute the suffering and the plun-
dering of the Mexicans to their racial inferiority than to accept that it could be
the result of the merciless search of power and wealth on the part of the
Americans.
In these descriptions of Mexicans formed by Americans in the above-mentioned
contexts, one of the factors that stands out the most as representative of
inferiority is the Mestizo character of the Mexican ‘race’, in which one finds,
according to American commentators, all the ‘poisonous’ combinations possible
of color and blood. Another motive of criticism was of the heterogeneous cha-
racter of the Mexicans that ‘speak more than twenty languages’.27
Mexicans are sketched as people that consequently try to do things with the
least physical and mental effort possible, as ‘uncivilized’, that are scarcely
26 The presentation of this ideology and its relationship with Mexicans are based on the
work of Reginald Horsman (1981). Race and Manifest Destiny. The Origins of American
Racial Anglo-Saxonism. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachussets and London,
England.
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above the masses of barbarians that surround them. They are associated with
adjectives such as the following: lazy, dirty, ignorant, dishonest, and cruel. In
contrast, for example, we see the human behavior that went to war with the
Texans in the cruel and uncivilized manner used to fight against the Mexicans.28
The dehumanization of the Mexicans made the plundering and abuse of those
who were subjugated by the Americans acceptable. Snatching land from them
was not a crime, but rather a fulfillment of the divine mandate to make it
fruitful.29 The destiny of the Americans was to populate the continent with in-
dustrious Anglo-Saxons, cultivate it, and expand the civilization. Facing the
Anglo-Saxon push, the other races that populated the continent vanished (a
euphemism for extermination) as the North American Indians had. A
narrativization of the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon race; chivalrous, lovers of
liberty, and expansionist, arose. The understanding of this ideology should
also incorporate a context in which economic depression and the increase of
German and Irish immigration created insecurity that they tried to alleviate
through a racial mythologization and the feelings of solidarity that this attempted
to create.
The expansion of England and the United States was seen as a realization of
the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race to take liberty and commerce to the most
remote regions of the planet for the good (universalization) of the whole world.
Therefore, when England attacked China during the opium war, the aggres-
sion was celebrated in the New York Herald with the following lines:
“Another movement of the Anglo-Saxon spirit in the remotest east, against the
barriers of semi-barbarians and a half-civilized race, who have been stationary
for twenty centuries or more.”30
27 The expressions of Mississippi senator Robert J. Walker, who became leader of the
Democratic Party in the mid-1840s, see Race and Manifest Destiny, pp. 215-216.
28 Ibid, p. 213
29 México lost half of its territory to the benefit of the United States. See Tulio Halperin
Donghi (1977). Historia Contemporánea de América Latina, p. 180. Alianza Editorial :
Madrid.
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VI. The ambiguous representation: rejection and
fascination
To this point I have outlined the more negative representations of the Others.
Nevertheless, we can confirm in the travel writing, literature, paintings, film,
musical and dance styles, movements of friends of the Indians, etc. that the
exotic and primitive Others have exercised and continue to exercise a fascina-
tion over Europeans and Americans. The fascination for the non-Western Other
has a long history and has been termed exoticism. Apparently, in this figure of
representation it is a matter of images and of a positive manner of speaking, as
the Others are trustees of virtues and qualities that we lack. However, this is
not necessarily the case. For example, in the ‘exotic’ representation the Other
is utilized as allegory to criticize aspects of the society that the subject it repre-
sents wants to transform. In this manner, American Indians or other primitive
peoples were used as an illustration of the opposite of the deficiencies and
vices of Western society that they wanted to criticize; among the (good) savages
there was no private property (seen much before Marx as a principal cause of
the evils of European society), social hierarchies and subordination, but there
was sexual liberty.31
In these and other ways of representing the Other, there was not interest in
getting to know him up close, to find out what he thinks about, feels, or longs
for. This same attitude is that which is expressed in travel and experience
narratives and in which the subject is a white European or American man that
tells of his relationship with exotic women and countries. The exotic woman is
doubly Other, exterior and strange because of her sex and furthermore (from
the perspective of the white, Western male), for her race. The motives behind
the desire of a relationship with the exotic woman are varied, but one of them
in the past and in the present has been that of giving flavor and color to a life
considered to be boring and insipid in Western societies. Thus, the French
naval officer Pierre Loti, who published books in the 1870s that were half
fiction and half travel narratives, wrote: “I have come to the conclusion that I
have right to do as I please, and that this insipid banquet of life requires all the
spice that one can lend it”.32  And more recently, Bell Hooks affirmed:
30 Race and Manifest Destiny p. 227.
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“The commodification of otherness has been so successful because it is offered
as a new delight, more intense, more satisfying than normal ways of doing and
feeling. Within commodity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that
can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture.”33
In Loti’s works the capacity of giving oneself over to actual sexual pleasure is
attributed to the black woman, a product of a natural sensuality associated
with a closeness to animals. In general, in order to represent people of other
races (black, and yellow in the vocabulary of the time period) animallike images
recur, thus the Japanese34 are compared to monkeys.
Loti not only wrote exotic narratives. He was also interested in the opposite
case, that is, that of the European citizen of a European colonial power who
sees himself obligated to remain in the colony when he longs to return to his
country. So the figures are inverted from exoticism (the Others and the Other
are the best) to nationalism (those which are ours and that which is ours is the
best) and of the xenophilia that becomes xenophobia. Apparently a paradox,
but as Todorov writes the common theme in both cases is that the Others are
seen and treated as objects, and we could also add the nature and culture of
their nations. The only subject is the white man. There is only interest in what
he feels, experiences, and thinks; the Others are simply objects and statistics.
We must underline the representations that Loti presents of Turks, Senegalese,
Tahitians, and Japanese. They were tied to a situation of dominance, that of
French colonialism.
One of the current forms of expression of the fascination for the primitive and/
or exotic35  Others is expressed as the nostalgia for their ways of life, cultures,
and traditions that the expansion of Western economy has destroyed. Think of
films about the redskins made by Americans, such as Dances with Wolves.
31 TODOROV Tzvetan On Human Diversity:  Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French
Thought, p. 208
32 Ibid., p. 352
33 Bell Hooks (1992). Black Looks. Race and Representation. South End Press: Boston,
MA, p.21.
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For some members of the white, Western, hegemonic culture the body of the
Other of color would be, still, the trustee of the primitive spirit.
The current desire for the Other of color has, then, also to do with the projection
onto him/her of plentitude, exuberance, corporeity of that which is lacking and
as in ancient religious ceremonies, the Other was devoured to take possession
of his virtues and of his spirit. Today one wants to sexually possess the Other
not only for the pleasure of the act but also because of the belief that this with
bring with it a transformation.36
It is indubitable that the nostalgia for the desire for the different Other is commer-
cialized, as seen with cigarettes such as Ducados with the round-bodied, soft,
sensual, young black women as a metaphor for the cigarette. Or how the nostal-
gia of romanticism, the erotic longing and the corporal plasticity have been
used to promote the group Buena Vista Social Club.37 Commercialization is
justly criticized, because it implies utilization, dehistorization, and depoli-
ticization and contributes to maintain, unquestioned, racial hegemony and white,
Western culture. For example, all of the production of cultural objects related
to the phenomenon of Buena Vista Social Club (compact discs, video, DVD,
photo book) have brought the flavor of Cuban music to the European public,
but without references to social and political contexts: that of the musicians in
their youth and that of Cuban music today. The incorporation of these contexts
carries with it a critical reflection that would lose in the tasting of the cultural
mouthful.
VII. Conclusions
Stereotypes and prejudice as forms of representation of the Others are not as
simple and innocent as the theories in vogue in the field of intercultural com-
munication might suggest. The research of academics like Michael Billig and
34 In Loti’s books we see a form of representing the Japanese that has lasted: “At the moment
of departure, I can only find within myself a smile of careless mockery for the swarming
crowd of this Liliputian curtseying people, “laborious, industrious, greedy of gain, tainted
with a constitutional affectation, hereditary insignificance, and incurable monkeyishness.”
Cited by Todorov in  On Human Diversity:  Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French
Thought  pp. 313.
35 This can also take the form of super-modern exoticism: the fascination that today’s Japan
exercises or the United States considered to be more advanced technologically than Western
Europeans.
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Michael Pickering show the need to distinguish between categories (necessary
to understand and order the world) and stereotypes as figures of representation
that are inadequate because of their inflexibility, their tendency to freeze a
meaning, dehistorization, and the hiding of important traits of the stereotyped
groups, etc.
One of the causes of the lasting nature of stereotypes and prejudice in spite of
better information and of the apparent better education of people is that they
are useful in the construction of a positive self-image in the groups that look at
the Others with disdain, through stereotypes and prejudice.
Another factor that is, perhaps, even more important, is the negative represen-
tation of the Others which has been and remains tied to ideologies. As a part of
these representations of the Others, they can be seen as strategies of symbolic
construction that share the rhetoric style of ideologies and that, upon represen-
ting the Others, utilize figures such as metonymy, metaphor, hyperbole, euphe-
mism, displacement, etc. Ideologies legitimize the dominance of one group
over another, and lead to discrimination, inequality, and, horror in these post-
modern times, exploitation. Innumerable cases in the relationships between
men and women, ethnic groups and even between nations can illustrate this
affirmation of the role of these ideologies. In this article, I have tried to demon-
strate how ideology and Anglo-Saxonism and the negative representations of
Mexicans tied to this ideology justified and made acceptable the appropriation
of half of the Mexican territory by the United States and the suffering of Mexi-
cans derived from this act of expansion. The representations of Mexicans and,
in fact, of Latin Americans in general (the authors studied maintain that
Americans tend to see Latin Americans based on the image that they have of
Mexicans) that come forth in this time period have lasted. This is not difficult
36 Bell Hooks tells that while teaching at Yale, the white students talked of “their plans to
fuck as many girls form other racial/ethnic groups as they could ‘catch before graduation’”.
In: Black Looks. Race and Representation, p. 23
37An article by Fernando Valerio-Holguín exists about this. Buena Vista Social Club:
Canibalismo cultural y nostalgia imperialista”. Retos para un nuevo milenio: Lengua, cultura
y sociedad. Actas del Coloquio Internacional de la Asociación Europea de Profesores de
Español, Ed. Sara Zas. Fort Collins, Colorado: Colorado State University. 2000. 79-86. The
article can be downloaded from the internet: http://lamar.colostate.edu/~fvalerio/buena-
vista.htm
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to confirm in the innumerable films in which American film has represented
Latin Americans: ignorant, dirty, corrupt, violent, superstitious, inefficient, cruel,
etc. We will have to examine how these representations have been used to
sanction the American interventions as the object of establishing regimes that
insure the economic and geopolitical dominance of the United States in the
region.
On the other extreme we find representations of the Others that are, apparently,
markedly positive. In these, the culture or the body of the Others would be in
harmony with nature. In this last case the Others have been or are instrumen-
talized with a utopian end: between them there is no private property, nor are
there social hierarchies or sexual restrictions or, in more recent times, the Others
are represented as the paradigm of the harmony with nature. Nevertheless,
how these exotic Others live, think, feel, desire, their institutions and ‘real’
history are not of great importance.
The need to give color and flavor to life in programmed, disillusioned societies
where instrumental knowledge is appropriated from the public and private
spheres, carried a desire for a more harmonious contact with the body and na-
ture, a longing for romanticism, eroticism or magic that is projected in the
exotic Others that are imagined as trustees of a great need to enjoy, dance,
rhythm, passion, feelings, etc. The body and culture of the exotic Others are
utilized to satisfy these deeply-felt feelings. They are commercialized, dehisto-
rized, depoliticized, and converted into objects. The latter is what gives meaning
to the apparent contradiction of negative and positive representations. When
the Others have been reduced to objects it is secondary if they are denigrated
or exalted; the important thing is that they are stripped of their condition as
integral human beings. The unique feelings, emotions, thoughts, and life expe-
riences that count are those of the ones that have the power to make their
representations the dominant ones.
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